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ABSTRACT 
 
Laurel Goldstein: Essence as a Social Property 
(Under the direction of Jan Boxill) 
 
In this thesis, I attempt to provide a characterisation of the kind woman, by 
determining what the essential property of the kind is (or whether there even is one), and 
with what kind of necessity it attaches to the kind members. I begin by outlining different 
ways essential properties have been approached in the current philosophical literature. A 
common feature of these views is that they focus on physical structure as essential to kinds 
and kind members. But, I argue, the kind woman cannot be so defined. Instead, the essential 
property of the kind woman should be given in terms of a social (or at least a non-biological) 
property. 
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1. Introduction 
Many authors make claims about women, the condition of women, and what changes 
should be effected for the benefit of women. This immediately raises the question, to whom 
are these claims intended to apply? It seems that an understanding of what women are (and 
not just who women are) is crucial to understanding what such claims are about. In this 
paper, I discuss various ways to characterise the kind woman – what kind of kind it might be, 
which property is essential to it, and with what kind of necessity this property attaches to 
members of the kind. 
In the Section 2, I outline different ways to approach kind membership and essence. I 
discuss whether essence is best conceived of as underlying structure, whether essence can be 
identified with one property, and whether such a property constitutes necessary and sufficient 
conditions for kind membership. I then review some difficulties that arise for such accounts 
of essence. By way of response to some of these problems, I discuss an account where kind 
membership is constrained both by essential properties and sortal concepts. 
In the Section 3, I consider whether the kind woman can be understood in terms of 
underlying physical structure; that is, whether women just are females. I argue that regardless 
of which view of kinds we adopt, women should not be characterised in terms of underlying 
physical structure, and so woman and female form two distinct kinds. 
Finally, because women cannot be characterised according to their underlying 
physical structure, in Section 4 I consider whether the essential property for membership in 
the kind woman might be given by a social property. I conclude in Section 5 by returning to 
the questions raised above and how understanding of the kind woman bears on theses 
questions. I also consider where such an essence locates the kind woman more generally in 
theories of kinds. 
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2. The Essence of Essence 
 
2.1. Underlying Physical Structure: Kripke (and Putnam1) 
 
One way to understand essence and kind membership is in terms of underlying 
physical structure. This is the approach of both Kripke and (an early incarnation of) Putnam. 
According to Kripke and Putnam, members of a natural kind share properties in two different 
ways. The first is by exhibiting what Kripke calls the same “identifying marks” (1980: 118). 
These identifying marks serve to provide a means of recognising what might constitute a 
kind. For example, the identifying marks for water might be colourless, odourless liquid. 
Having settled on the identifying marks, we can now give an operational definition for what 
it is to be, e.g. water. 
The operational definition…is simply a way of pointing out a standard – pointing out 
the stuff in the actual world such that for x to be water, in any world, is for x to bear 
the relation sameL to the normal members of the class of local entities that satisfy the 
operational definition. (Putnam 1975: 232). 
 
An operational definition based on identifying marks provides a means of identifying 
what might be water, based on surface level, observable qualities. At the level of identifying 
marks, the operational definition allows us to stipulate that in order for something to be 
water, it must stand in the sameL relation to the stuff that actually has the identifying marks 
of (i.e. looks like) water (whatever the stuff that has those identifying marks actually turns 
out to be). Identifying marks allow us to say what kind of stuff water must be identical to, but 
it does not allow us to make a claim about the content of the sameL relation. At the level of 
identifying marks, whatever the essence of water is, it is the thing in virtue of which other 
liquids stand in the relation sameL to the colourless, odourless liquid in the actual world. But 
what makes other liquids stand in this relation to the colourless, odourless liquid cannot 
necessarily be given in terms of identifying marks alone. 
According to Kripke and Putnam, standing in the relation sameL to water is not 
simply a matter of exhibiting the same identifying marks but also involves underlying 
structure. The reason for this is that the relation sameL is defined in terms of underlying 
physical properties: “x bears the relation sameL to y just in case (1) x and y are both liquids, 
and (2) x and y agree in important physical properties,” (Putnam 238-239). While 
acknowledging that “importance is an interest-relative notion” (Putnam 239) and therefore, 
that the underlying physical properties need not be the ones that characterise the relation, 
Putnam also claims that “the ‘important’ properties of a liquid or solid, etc., are the ones that 
are structurally important: the ones that specify what the liquid or solid, etc., is actually made 
out of…and how they are arranged or combined to produce the superficial characteristics,” 
(Putnam 239). 
The importance of underlying structure to kind membership is illustrated by Putnam’s 
Twin Earth examples. Although water and Twin Earth water are both colourless, odourless 
liquids that quench thirst and are found in rivers and oceans, (i.e. they exhibit the same 
identifying marks) they do not share an underlying structure: water is H2O, and Twin Earth 
water is XYZ. So even though H2O and XYZ share identifying marks, because XYZ is not 
the same underlying physical structure as H2O, water on Twin Earth does not stand in the 
relation sameL to water on Earth. Because water is identified by what stands in the relation 
sameL to the colourless, odourless stuff on Earth, and that stuff on Earth is H2O and not 
XYZ, Twin Earth water is not really water. The reason identifying marks provide an 
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operational definition rather than the essence is that based on identifying marks alone, water 
and Twin Earth water would be members of the same kind, but because they have different 
underlying structures, they are not. Twin Earth water satisfies the operational definition for 
water, but does not stand in the sameL relation to water because it does not have the 
appropriate underlying physical structure. So it is not water. 
Because both Kripke and Putnam identify the underlying physical properties as the 
properties relevant to determining essence and, consequently, kind membership, the relation 
sameL (which determines sameness of kind) is defined by structural properties. “If there is a 
hidden structure, then generally it determines what it is to be a member of the natural kind,” 
(Putnam 241). While identifying marks provide a way to identify which stuff we might 
investigate to see if it has the underlying structure, the important way to share properties, and 
the way to get membership in a kind, is by sharing underlying structural properties – having 
the same thing be responsible for the appearance of the identifying marks. 
But underlying properties do more than simply sort things into one kind or another. 
Kripke and Putnam claim that underlying physical properties are the essence of the kind. 
Because the underlying physical structure is essential to the kind, underlying physical 
structure characterises the kind, “not only in the actual world, but in all possible worlds,” 
(Putnam 241). Whatever the underlying structure is determines the property that identifies 
something as a member of that kind in every possible world. Underlying structure as essence 
means, for example, that because water is H2O, there could not be water that does not have 
that same underlying structure (and further, it could not have been that water does not have 
that structure). 
When we say that it could have turned out that water had no hidden structure what we 
mean is that a liquid with no hidden structure (i.e. many bits of different liquids, with 
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nothing in common except superficial characteristics) could have looked like water, 
tasted like water, and have filled the lakes, etc., that are actually full of water. 
(Putnam 241). 
 
Since water has an underlying structure which is responsible for the identifying marks 
water exhibits, in order for anything to be water, it must also have that structure. When we 
make possibility claims about what water might have been (i.e. when we say that water might 
not have been H2O), these are claims about epistemic, not metaphysical possibility. We 
might have discovered that water has no interesting underlying physical structure, or that its 
structure is XYZ. But given that water has a certain underlying structure which provides the 
essence of what it is to be water, it could not be that water has no underlying structure or a 
different underlying structure. It could be/have been that something else is what produces the 
identifying marks associated with water, but given that the source of these marks is H2O, 
nothing other than H2O could have been water. Even if some liquid were to exhibit the same 
identifying marks and fill the same functional role as water, however waterlike that other 
stuff appeared, it still would not be water (although it still seems plausible to say that it 
mightEPISTEMIC have been water). 
Because of this (supposed) link between essence and underlying structure, Kripke 
claims that “statements representing scientific discoveries about what this stuff is are not 
contingent truths but necessary truths in the strictest possible sense,” (Kripke 125). The 
reason for this is that once science has given us the (correct) underlying structure of some 
substance (i.e. a kind), anything that really is a member of that kind must have a certain 
structure. 
Kripke and Putnam1 provide an account of kinds that relies on underlying physical 
structure. Because underlying physical structure determines kind membership, the structure 
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can identify the kind in other possible worlds, and so provides the essential property of the 
kind.  
2.2. Superficial Structure: Putnam2
Although we may prefer to characterise essential properties in terms of underlying 
structure, it could turn out that in some cases, essence depends on superficial characteristics. 
Putnam considers such a scenario, where essential properties of kinds are still physical 
properties, but superficial, rather than underlying. 
It could have turned out that the bits of liquid we call ‘water’ had no important common 
physical characteristics except the superficial ones. In that case the necessary and sufficient 
condition for being ‘water’ would have been possession of sufficiently many of the 
superficial characteristics. (Putnam 241). 
 
This account of kinds and what kind membership consists in is similar to the one 
discussed immediately above in that it appeals to physical structure – but importantly, it 
differs in where in the structure the essence is located. This account allows for kinds (and 
essences) even if there is no underlying structure that is importantly or interestingly involved 
in producing the identifying marks. Were there no such underlying properties, Putnam 
contends that physical properties could still be the essential properties of kinds. It might have 
been that there was a colourless odourless liquid that fills rivers and oceans (i.e. something 
with the same identifying marks as water and function as water) that had no underlying 
structure – of course it is impossible that such a liquid be water – but had this liquid been 
water, then standing in the sameL relation to water would not be a matter of sharing an 
underlying structure, but sufficiently many surface characteristics. 
This account of kinds allows the essence to be a superficial property or identifying 
mark, rather than underlying structure. It seems, however, that this approach is only appealed 
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to when underlying structure fails for some reason or other. Essence by underlying structure 
seems to be the preferred way of accounting for kind membership.  
2.3. Lawlike Behaviour: Putnam3
Although Putnam initially defends the view that physical properties provide the 
essence of kinds, he later argues that physical properties alone cannot establish membership 
in a kind. In his paper, “Is Water Necessarily H2O” (1990), he argues that the possession of 
physical properties, whether underlying or superficial, does not guarantee membership in a 
kind. On these accounts locating a kind’s essence must also guarantee locating the kind, but, 
Putnam argues, a physical property might not always indicate the kind, and so cannot 
constitute its essence.  
For example, as far as the previous two ways for accounting for essences are 
concerned, anything with the underlying structure H2O is water and all water is H2O; or 
where superficial characteristics are used to identify kinds, anything that is, e.g. a colourless, 
odourless liquid is water, and water is anything that is a colourless, odourless liquid. The 
property or properties that constitute the essence are both necessary and sufficient for 
determining membership in a kind.  
But, Putnam argues, the underlying physical structure (or cluster of superficial 
properties) is not, and cannot be, necessary and sufficient for identifying a kind. The reason 
for this is that using physical structure as a means of identifying substances across possible 
worlds is only successful when those worlds obey the same physical laws as the actual world. 
“I do not think that a criterion of substance-identity that handles Twin Earth cases will extend 
handily to ‘possible worlds.’ In particular, what if a hypothetical ‘world’ obeys different 
laws?” (Putnam 1990: 69). Putnam worries that a world similar to Earth in many respects 
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could obey different physical laws. In such a world, there may be a compound H2O, but 
because the laws are different, it may be that this compound neither behaves similarly to, nor 
shares (sufficiently many) identifying marks with water. In such a deviant-law world, these 
behavioural/superficial differences might affect whether we would even consider H2O to be 
water. That is, Putnam doubts whether “it [is] clear that we would call a (hypothetical) 
substance with quite different behavior water in these circumstances,” (Putnam70).  
In the situation Putnam imagines, the underlying structure of a kind is present, but the 
kind water (arguably, or at least intuitively) is not. He takes this as evidence that underlying 
structure alone cannot provide the essence of kinds. If it could, then the presence of the 
underlying structure would always guarantee presence of kind, and vice versa. But in the 
world Putnam imagines, the underlying structure may be present without the kind; so there is 
no guarantee that discovering H2O (i.e. something standing in the sameL relation to water) is 
really water (or something we would count as water). Because of this, the essential property 
of a kind cannot simply be identified with the kind itself. This scenario leads Putnam to reject 
underlying physical properties, in and of themselves, as the essences of kinds, and 
consequently, to reject metaphysical necessity. He does this because if the underlying 
property or structure cannot be used to identify the kind without e.g. also fixing the physical 
laws, then the necessity is not really metaphysical (i.e. does not hold in all possible worlds) 
but physical (i.e. holds only in those worlds with the same laws as the actual world).  
Putnam’s rejection of metaphysical necessity because underlying physical structure is 
not necessary and sufficient for identifying a kind might be somewhat premature, however. 
His argument so far does not show that there are no necessary and sufficient conditions for 
identifying kinds, just that underlying physical structure does not provide these conditions – 
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if underlying structure is to be necessary and sufficient, the possible worlds which we are 
considering must be restricted to the ones that have the same physical laws. But Putnam does 
not even consider that other kinds of properties, such as the superficial characteristics to 
which he refers earlier, might constitute essences, and therefore ground metaphysical 
necessity.  
If the superficial characteristics can provide the essence of a kind, then there is no 
worry that different laws might affect what would be identified as its members – the essence 
of e.g. water would just be colourless odourless liquid, so the kind water would just be 
whatever the colourless, odourless liquid was. “One might hold that ‘water’ was world-
relative but constant in meaning (i.e. the word has a constant relative meaning). In this 
theory, ‘water’ means the same in W1 and W2; it’s just that water is H2O in W1 and water is 
XYZ in W2” (Putnam 1975: 231). This way of fixing the meaning of ‘water’ gives primacy to 
the primary intension of the term. The primary intension of a term, e.g. ‘water’ is given by a 
qualitative description of what the term picks out, and (usually) refers to a superficial 
property. “The primary intension of a token of ‘water’, very roughly, picks out the clear, 
drinkable liquid with which the individual…is acquainted,” (Chalmers 2006: 586). So if 
‘water’ means the same thing in W1 as it does in W2, and meaning (in some way) determines 
reference, then meaning also provides the criterion for determining what ‘water’ refers to (i.e. 
what water is). If the meaning with which we are concerned is the meaning given by the 
primary intension of ‘water’, and the primary intension is constant across worlds (i.e. ‘water’ 
just means ‘clear drinkable stuff’), then ‘water’ is a rigid designator, which “in every possible 
world…designates the same object,” (Kripke 48). A rigid designator picks out the same thing 
in all possible worlds (where it exists), where “the same thing” is determined by what the 
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essence of the thing is in the actual world. And because the essence of a kind is fixed by the 
actual world, it matters for purposes of cross-world identification whether the essence is 
conceived of in terms of superficial characteristics (i.e. given by the primary intension) or by 
underlying structure. If the latter, then the criterion for being, e.g. water, is given not by the 
primary intension, but by the secondary intension.  
The secondary intension of a term is given by non-superficial underlying properties, 
e.g. H2O. If the secondary intension of a term is what determines its referent, then it refers to 
that underlying structure in any possible world, regardless of what superficial characteristics 
it produces. “An expression’s secondary intension…is just its familiar post-Kripkean 
intension, picking out the extension of the expression in counterfactual worlds….The 
secondary intension of ‘water’ picks out H2O in all worlds,” (Chalmers 586). If the essence 
of water is given by the secondary intension for ‘water’, i.e. if the essence of water is H2O, 
then ‘water’ rigidly designates H2O.  
But on the suggestion that superficial characteristics (and not underlying structure) 
constitute the essence of water, the essence just is being a colourless, odourless liquid. When 
the primary intension of a term determines the essence of the kind, the secondary intension 
may vary from world to world. This approach to essence and kind membership, where 
superficial characteristics provide the necessary and sufficient conditions, avoids the 
difficulty Putnam raises for kinds based on underlying structure. If ‘water’ refers to a certain 
set of superficial characteristics and these fix the meaning of ‘water’, then what water is (i.e. 
its essence) will not be affected by different physical laws. 
Although this approach to essence and kinds avoids the problem Putnam raises for 
underlying structure as metaphysically necessary, it is subject to a different criticism. Using 
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superficial characteristics to identify kinds requires two different criteria for kind 
membership: one within a world, and another across worlds. The reason for this is that 
although identifying kinds by superficial characteristics might be successful for cross-world 
kind identifications, it is not how we classify kinds in the actual world.  
In the actual world, kinds are identified not solely by their superficial characteristics, 
but also by their underlying structure. For example, both water and vodka are colourless 
liquids, but this superficial similarity is not enough to group them as a kind. In fact, we 
consider them to be different kinds because they have different underlying physical 
structures. (It might be argued that even on the basis of superficial characteristics water and 
vodka do not constitute a kind because vodka is not odourless, and it is not found in rivers 
and oceans, etc. that is, they do not share sufficiently many characteristics to plausibly be 
considered a kind anyway. I am ignoring these differences for the purposes of this example. 
If it really is that problematic, consider gold and fool’s gold, which resemble each other in 
very many superficial respects, and are distinguished by their underlying physical structure). 
There are also cases where we want to say that two substances are of the same kind, 
but they do not really bear much superficial resemblance to one another. For example, 
chemically pure water and water from the Willamette River may not superficially resemble 
one another in any respect except by being liquid. But because both substances share an 
underlying structure, we say they are members of the same kind. We do not consider 
substances to be of the same kind just because they resemble one another; nor does lack of 
superficial resemblance prevent substances from being of the same kind. 
So if superficial characteristics are the essence of kinds, then it seems that we would 
be using a different criterion to identify kinds in other possible worlds than in the actual 
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world. If superficial characteristics are going to provide essence and consequently determine 
kind membership in other possible worlds, then this should be the criterion employed in the 
actual world as well. The problem is that this is not how we identify kinds in the actual 
world, we identify them by underlying structure. But underlying structure (for the reasons 
Putnam gives) cannot provide necessary and sufficient conditions for kinds across possible 
worlds. In order to get essence in the actual world, we appeal to underlying structure; but in 
order to get essence in possible worlds, it seems we must appeal to superficial characteristics. 
It seems problematic and highly undesirable if 1) there is not a unified account of what 
constitutes the essence of kinds; and 2) the cross-world notion is not the one we actually 
employ, since kind membership (i.e. essence) is supposedly determined by what is actual. So 
a notion of essence that differs from our actual notion of essence cannot be used to identify 
kinds across possible worlds.  
In this section, I explained why Putnam separates essence from underlying physical 
structure. He argues that essence cannot just be a single underlying physical property, 
because underlying physical structure might only be essential when other features of the 
worlds, e.g. its physical laws, are fixed. So if there is any kind of necessity to being a 
member of a kind, it is at most physical necessity (since necessity is determined relative to 
physical laws) and not metaphysical necessity (it cannot be given by a property alone – any 
kind of property). Putnam dispenses with metaphysical necessity because he takes himself to 
show that no property is both necessary and sufficient for kind membership. Underlying 
properties can only be essential relative to physical laws; superficial properties, if essential, 
require us to adopt one notion of essence for the actual world (underlying structure) and 
another for possible worlds (superficial structure). 
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2.4. Sortal Concepts and Necessary Conditions: Hale 
Yet another way of understanding kind membership and essence is advanced by Hale 
(2004). Hale, while sympathetic to Putnam’s position that underlying physical structure may 
neither identify a kind nor constitute necessary and sufficient conditions for kind 
membership, argues that we need not conceive of metaphysical necessity in this way. Instead 
of appealing to necessary and sufficient conditions to provide the essential properties of 
kinds, he claims that the essence of a kind need only be a necessary condition.  
The reason for this is that intuitively, in another possible world, we might wonder 
whether some colourless odourless liquid is water, but would probably not wonder whether 
some pink solid is water. That is, the question of whether something in another possible 
world is a member of a particular kind (and so whether it possesses a given property as an 
essential property) only arises for things in that world that bear a superficial resemblance to 
things in the actual world. That is, we only wonder whether something in another possible 
world is e.g. water if it falls under our sortal concept water. But neither satisfying a sortal 
concept nor exhibiting certain superficial characteristics by virtue of which the concept is 
satisfied should be understood as sufficient for kind membership. Instead, satisfying a sortal 
concept just is what it is to be an object.  
[T]o be an object is, necessarily, to be an object of some specifiable kind–to fall 
under what is now widely called a sortal concept, that is, a concept with which is 
associated not only a criterion of application but also a principle of identification and 
distinction among its instances. (Hale 2004: 372-373).  
 
While the content sortal concepts is determined by superficial characteristics (where 
content is understood as features something must possess in order to satisfy the sortal), 
because sortal satisfaction not sufficient for kind membership, Hale’s account of kinds can 
accommodate Putnam’s Twin Earth case. Water and Twin Earth water both satisfy the sortal 
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concept water. But because Twin Earth water is not H2O, it is not a member of the kind 
water, so Hale can explain how two substances may bear a superficial resemblance to one 
another without requiring them to be the same kind. But appealing to sortals also allows him 
to explain why, in other possible worlds, we only consider something to be of the same kind 
as something in the actual world if it superficially resembles the thing in the actual world. 
Satisfaction of a sortal concept (i.e. possessing certain superficial properties) is not a 
necessary condition for kind membership either, and does not constitute the essence of a 
kind. The essence of the kind is given by the necessary condition for kind membership, given 
in terms of underlying structure. In the case of water, the necessary condition is being H2O. 
That is, a substance in another possible world that satisfies our sortal concept water but is not 
H2O is not water. 
Underlying physical properties are the essential properties of kinds, but these 
properties are only necessary and not sufficient for kind membership. This allows Hale to 
accommodate Putnam’s argument against metaphysical necessity. Putnam’s claim is that in 
some world H2O might not bear any kind of superficial resemblance to H2O in the actual 
world. Especially if part of being water is standing in the sameL relation to actual water, if 
this relation is given in terms of underlying physical structure, in worlds where all H2O is 
some kind of pink solid, this pink solid certainly will not stand in the sameL relation to water 
(for one reason, because the pink solid is not a liquid).  
But Hale’s account of essence can rule out such counterexamples. In part, he does this 
by appealing to the sortal concepts. Simply locating the essential property for membership in 
a kind need not involve locating the kind (since we are only concerned with whether 
something in another possible world is of the same kind as something in this world if it 
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resembles the thing in this world). So, Hale claims, if kind membership is (initially) limited 
to what falls under the same sortal concept as kind members in the actual world, Putnam’s 
deviant-law case does not show that there is no metaphysical necessity. 
But now notice that what the case he [Putnam] envisages in support of this claim [that 
there are no necessary and sufficient conditions for kind identity] tells against (if it is 
good) is the sufficiency [of] the proposed criterion – that is, what is put in doubt is 
that being composed of H2O molecules is sufficient for something’s being water. It 
doesn’t touch the question whether being composed of H2O molecules is necessary 
for being water. (Hale 377). 
 
A single property can still characterise a kind (i.e. metaphysical necessity is retained), 
regardless of whether other aspects of possible worlds (such as the laws) are fixed, because 
we need not identify everything with the essential property as a member of the kind (i.e. the 
essential property is not sufficient for kind membership). We need only identify something as 
a member of the kind if, in addition to having the essential property, it also satisfies some 
reasonable construal of our sortal concept. So metaphysical necessity, when constrained by 
sortal concepts in this way, does not entail the unintuitive result that anything whatsoever, if 
it is H2O is water.  Instead, Hale claims “just that water is necessarily H2O, not that H2O is 
necessarily water – that is, it can be a claim about the composition of water, not an identity 
claim,” (Hale 377). As such, that H2O is the essential property of water is only a claim about 
the composition of something in another possible world that reasonably resembles water in 
the actual world.  
It might seem that using sortal concepts to limit kind membership amounts to taking 
satisfaction of a sortal concept as a necessary condition for kind membership. But Hale’s 
claim is not, if this is water then it both satisfies the sortal concept water and is H2O. 
Satisfaction of the sortal concept water should not be understood as constitutive or criterial of 
what it is to be water; satisfaction of the sortal simply provides an explanation for why we 
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consider some things that are H2O water, but why we do not consider everything that is H2O 
water. That is, sortal concepts can explain why, in a deviant-law world, H2O might not be 
water. If H2O has very different superficial characteristics than it does in the actual world, 
then we would not count H2O as water in that world. The reason for this is that the substance 
composed of H2O in that world does not fall under our sortal concept water. This does not 
tell against the metaphysical necessity of water being H2O, however. Water is still 
necessarily H2O, even though the pink-H2O solid is not water. 
Not every sortal concept picks out a group of objects for which the necessary 
condition for membership is an essential property of the objects. In order for a necessary 
condition to count as an essence, the sortal concept must be what Hale identifies as a basic 
sortal concept. 
Let us say that a sortal concept F is basic – a concept of a fundamental kind of object 
– if (i) if F applies to any object, it applies to that object throughout its existence, and, 
(ii) given that an object is F, its ceasing to be F counts as that object’s ceasing to be. 
(Hale 373).  
 
A basic sortal is contrasted with phase sortals and role sortals. A phase sortal applies 
to an object for some part of its existence, but ceasing to fall under the sortal does not mean 
that it no longer exists or has undergone some change of identity, e.g. “child, tadpole, and 
piglet” (Hale 373). An object satisfies a role sortal by virtue of fulfilling a particular function, 
e.g. “doorstop and bookmark” (Hale 373). Necessary conditions for non-basic sortals are not 
essential properties. If not for this restriction, objects could gain and lose essences, but an 
essence is not the sort of thing that an object can gain and lose; it is supposed to have it as 
long as it exists. But since necessary conditions are essences only if they are necessary 
conditions for kinds picked out by basic sortals, essence is tied to existence in an intuitively 
desirable way. If an object is a member of a basic sortal kind, then it is a member of that kind 
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necessarily. If it stops falling under the sortal concept, it has gone out of existence, and if it 
stops satisfying the necessary condition, it is no longer a member of the kind, and so has 
undergone a change of identity (i.e. the object that satisfied the necessary condition no longer 
exists). 
There is also a distinction to be drawn between the essential property of a kind (i.e. 
the necessary condition something must satisfy in order to be considered a member of the 
kind) and the essential property of the kind member (i.e. the property of a kind member that, 
if it loses, it goes out of existence). For example, ‘attends school regularly’ might be the 
essential property for membership in the kind student, but this does not mean that it is an 
essential property of anyone who is actually a student. The necessary condition is an essential 
property of the kind, but not necessarily an essential property of the kind members. 
But someone might object to Hale’s account of essence on the grounds that the basic 
sortal concepts are not really basic. That is, if the necessary condition for membership in a 
kind is an essential property of the kind member only when the member falls under a basic 
sortal concept, then being a kind picked out by basic sortal concept (rather than a phase or 
role sortal) is very important to Hale’s account of essence. But even for basic sortals, e.g. 
water, there are features (superficial characteristics) in virtue of which a substance falls under 
the sortal concept. If so, then it seems that water might not be the basic sortal concept. 
Instead, the basic sortal concepts are the ones for the features in virtue of which a substance 
satisfies the sortal concept water, e.g. the sortals colourless, odourless, and liquid. Since this 
group of sortal concepts (or one like it) is the one that a substance must satisfy to be 
identified as water, it seems more accurate to take these as the basic sortal concepts, rather 
than the conglomerate complex of a sortal concept, water. That is, since water is not a 
 18
conceptually simple sortal, it should not be considered a basic sortal. If this is correct, then 
being member of the kind water is not a matter of continually falling under the sortal concept 
water, but under water’s constituent sortal concepts.  
This is not a serious problem for Hale’s account of basic sortal concepts, however. It 
seems that he can just concede that a basic sortal concept is a conglomerate of more basic (or 
simple) concepts, without revising the kind of work that the basic sortal concept is doing. He 
can allow that satisfying the constituent simple concepts just is satisfying the basic one, since 
what it is to satisfy the basic one just is to satisfy the simple ones. If the content of a basic 
sortal concept is defined by some group of simple sortal concepts,1 then there is really no 
interesting difference as to whether the necessary condition attaches to kind picked out by the 
basic sortal concept water or to the kind picked out by the appropriate cluster of simple 
concepts. The reason for this is that presumably the content of a basic sortal (its constituent 
simple concepts) is determined by conceptual analysis. It might have been that the sortal 
concept water was satisfied by pink solids. If this had been the case, then falling under the 
sortal concept water would be a matter of satisfying the simple concepts pink and solid. 
Nothing importantly metaphysical really hangs on what, in fact, falls under a particular basic 
sortal concept; the way a basic sortal concept is specified or defined is not what determines 
whether a necessary condition is essential to the objects that fall under the sortal. Although 
we (initially) limit kind membership based on falling under a sortal concept (and so sort by a 
criterion based in conceptual analysis), the necessary condition (which is not fixed by 
conceptual analysis) is what does the real work of determining whether something is a 
                                                 
1 E.g. continual satisfaction of the sortal concept water just is continual satisfaction of some simple sortals, such 
as colourless, odourless, and liquid. 
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member of a kind. Hale need not worry that basic sortal concepts are not conceptually basic, 
because ultimately the specifics of the analysis of these concepts are not what determines 
whether something is a member of a kind.  
2.5. Summary 
In this section, I have outlined four different ways to understand essence. The first is 
in terms of underlying physical structure; the second, by sharing certain superficial 
characteristics; the third by adhering to a certain set of physical laws (perhaps a special case 
of the first); and finally, by satisfying the necessary condition as determined by falling under 
a certain type of sortal concept. 
Essence identified as underlying structure that is both necessary and sufficient 
conditions for membership in a kind is potentially problematic for the reason Putnam 
considers: given a sufficient degree of variation in physical laws, a substance can have an 
underlying physical structure without that being enough to qualify it as a member of a kind. 
Putnam takes this to be evidence against metaphysical necessity – that is, necessary 
properties of objects can only be fixed relative to physical laws, not by underlying structure 
alone. (Because essence in a class of worlds restricted by physical laws is still given in terms 
of underlying structure that is either identified with or necessary and sufficient for 
membership in a kind, Putnam’s notion of essence here seems to be just a restricted version 
of Kripke’s). 
Hale then rejects the analysis of essence as underlying structure that is both necessary 
and sufficient for kind membership, and so rejects Putnam’s argument against metaphysical 
necessity. He argues that essence can be characterised by an underlying property that is 
necessary, but not sufficient, for kind membership. He restricts which necessary conditions 
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count as essences by appealing to basic sortal concepts – in order to be an essential property 
of an object, the kind to which the object belongs (by virtue of possessing that property) must 
be a kind that is picked out by a basic sortal concept. Because Hale specifies what essence is 
without appeal to other features of the world, the necessary properties of kinds are 
metaphysically necessary properties of those kinds. Nor is metaphysical necessity just 
conceptual necessity. While what it is to fall under a sortal concept is given by conceptual 
analysis, falling under a sortal concept is not (and so conceptual analysis is not) what 
determines kind membership. Kind membership is determined by possession of the property 
provided by the necessary condition, which is discovered empirically. 
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3. An Attempt at Biological Essence 
All this discussion of essence is for the purpose of determining how to best describe 
what women are. If there is a kind woman, then there is (at least) a necessary condition that 
must be satisfied in order to be a member of the kind (i.e. there is some essential property 
that attaches to the kind). It is a separate question whether in addition to this, the necessary 
condition for membership in the kind is an essential property of the kind members. In this 
section, I consider whether there is a necessary condition for membership in the kind woman 
and if there is, how it is best understood. 
3.1. Are Women Just XX? 
It might be that despite difficulties with the account outlined in Section 2, the most 
accurate way to describe the kind woman is along broadly Kripkean lines, as a kind 
distinguished by underlying biological structure, or chromosomes. On this approach, the 
underlying structure identifies the kind – it provides both necessary and sufficient conditions 
for kind membership, and in addition, is an essential property of the members. If this is how 
the kind woman is to be understood, then it seems that woman is just another name for the 
kind female. So part of determining what the essential property of the kind woman is, and 
whether it is an essential property of women, is determining whether there is nothing more to 
being a woman than being female. 
Let female be a natural kind in the Kripkean sense – a kind whose essence is 
determined by an underlying physical structure – and let the underlying structure, which is 
both necessary and sufficient for kind membership, be (just) XX chromosomes. So if women 
just are females, then women also form a natural kind. This kind is determined by the 
underlying physical structure, a structure which each member has as a matter of metaphysical 
necessity (that is, if women in fact have a certain underlying structure, then it couldn’t have 
been otherwise – something that looks just like a woman but does not have that structure 
might have filled the role of a woman, but wouldn’t really be a woman). If the kind woman 
can be characterised in terms of underlying structure XX, then the kind woman just is the 
kind female.  
One reason that women just might be females is that women exhibit certain 
identifying marks, i.e. certain secondary sex characteristics, for which we take the 
chromosomal structure XX to be responsible. So if XX were the necessary condition for 
being a woman, then every member of the kind should be XX.  
But XX chromosomes alone do not always suffice to classify someone correctly as a 
woman. There can be a mismatch between the identifying marks and underlying physical 
structure: 
In contrast with the true hermaphrodites, the pseudo-hermaphrodites possess two 
gonads of the same kind along with the usual male (XY) or female (XX) 
chromosomal makeup. But their external genitalia and secondary sex characteristics 
do not match their chromosomes. Thus merms have testes and XY chromosomes, yet 
they also have a vagina and a clitoris, and at puberty they often develop breasts. They 
do not menstruate, however. Ferms have ovaries, two X chromosomes and sometimes 
a uterus, but they also have at least partly masculine external genitalia. Without 
medical intervention they can develop beards, deep voices and adult-size penises. 
 
No classification scheme could more than suggest the variety of sexual anatomy 
encountered in clinical practice. (Fausto-Sterling 1993: 22). 
 
The identifying marks characteristic of women can have two different underlying 
structures, XX and XY. This in and of itself need not be problematic for characterising 
women, since just as gold and fool’s gold exhibit the same identifying marks but have 
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different underlying structures, so might there be two different types of women: women 
(identical with females, and so XX) and “fool’s women” (not identical with females). If this 
were the case then the explanation of the relation of the kind female to woman, as with gold 
and fool’s gold, would simply be that identifying marks can be misleading and the true kinds 
(and their members) are revealed by underlying structure.  
What really creates the problem for identifying the kind woman with female is that 
XX chromosomes, which I am taking to be the essential property of females, gives rise to 
two completely different sets of identifying marks. XX chromosomes produce two sets of 
secondary sex characteristics (admittedly, one with far greater frequency than the other, but 
the non-standard cases cannot simply be discounted), one which typifies women, the other, 
men. As such, there does not seem to be a straightforward relationship or correspondence 
between the underlying structure associated with females and the set of identifying marks 
associated with women. If XX really is what is responsible for the appearance of the 
identifying marks associated with women, then it should not also give rise to the 
(supposedly) complementary identifying marks associated with men (and a different 
underlying structure, XY). One reason for taking the underlying structure as the essential 
property of the kind and kind members is that it seems to explain why the surface 
characteristics are the way they are. But in the case of female and woman, the underlying 
structure does not always explain the surface characteristics; so the kinds female and woman 
are not identical.  
Additionally, it seems that the kinds woman and female should not be identified with 
one another because of the worries Putnam raises in Section 2.3. Just as the underlying 
structure H2O might not give rise to anything recognisably water, the underlying structure 
 24
XX might not give rise to anything recognisable as a woman (not just in some cases as 
actually occurs, but in most or all cases). Putnam’s claim in the case of women might be that 
no property is metaphysically necessary (i.e. essential) for membership in the kind woman 
(because this property does not characterise women unless certain physical laws are also 
fixed, so the property is only physically necessary). Alternatively, perhaps this extension of 
Putnam’s worry simply shows that there is some property that could constitute the 
metaphysical essence of woman and its members, but that the best way to capture this 
property might not be in terms of underlying physical structure. 
Because there is no (guaranteed) one-to-one mapping between underlying structure 
and identifying marks, if the kind female is identified with the underlying structure XX, and 
the kind woman is characterised by a set of secondary sex characteristics, then the kind 
woman cannot simply be identical to the kind female. Chromosomes are not the underlying 
structure that provides the necessary condition for membership in the kind woman. 
3.2. Are Females Just XX? 
If Putnam’s worry about metaphysical necessity can extend to woman, then it might 
also apply to the kind female. That is, if an altered environment could result in individuals 
who are XX but not recognisably women (so XX is not the essential property of the kind 
woman), then might there be individuals who are XX but not recognisably female? If so, then 
underlying physical structure might not be what provides the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for membership in the kind female either. 
In order for it to be an intelligible possibility that not all XX-individuals are female, 
XX cannot characterise the kind female by definition. (I.e. it cannot be a conceptual truth that 
XX characterises female; if it were, then asking whether some females might not be XX is 
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like asking, de dicto, whether some bachelors might not be unmarried). Thus far, I have been 
assuming that to be female just is to be XX, regardless superficial characteristics. But closer 
examination reveals that this assumption may be incorrect. Just as we associate certain 
superficial characteristics with woman, we associate superficial characteristics with female 
and its members – namely the secondary sex characteristics that we also associate with 
women. The sortal concept female has the same content (i.e. same list of features associated 
with it) as the sortal concept woman (alternatively, the terms ‘female’ and ‘woman’ have the 
same primary intension). 
 One reason for taking female as a sortal concept whose content is given by secondary 
sex characteristics (instead of by chromosomal structure) is that we classify someone as 
female not by what her chromosomes are, but by her appearance. We then infer from this 
appearance to her chromosomal structure. Given that superficial characteristics provide the 
primary intension of ‘female’, it makes sense to ask whether someone might have XX 
chromosomes without being female and whether someone might be female without having 
XX chromosomes, (i.e. neither question is just whether someone might have XX 
chromosomes without having XX chromosomes). So being a member of the kind female 
seems to rely not just on satisfying the necessary and sufficient condition of being XX, but 
also on being constrained by the sortal concept. That is, female is not a Kripkean kind that 
can be characterised by necessary and sufficient conditions for membership. It is better 
thought of as a kind along the lines of Hale’s analysis, where kind membership is initially 
restricted to the things that satisfy the sortal concept which in addition, satisfy a necessary 
condition. So someone may satisfy the sortal concept female without satisfying the necessary 
condition, and so not be a member of the kind female. (This accommodates people who have 
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the superficial characteristics of females/women, but are not XX, e.g. certain intersex 
individuals and transsexuals. These people satisfy the sortal concept female but are not XX, 
and so are not members of the kind female). 
A problem with adopting this approach to the kind female, however, is that it seems 
to exclude people we intuitively want to include as members of the kind, that is, people who 
satisfy the necessary condition, but not the sortal concept. Such people might either have XX 
chromosomes and atypical secondary sex characteristics, or be transsexual (woman ? man). 
If someone must satisfy the sortal concept to even be considered a member of the kind, then 
no one can be female unless she exhibits the appropriate identifying marks. There are two 
reasons for resisting satisfaction of the sortal concept as a necessary condition for kind 
membership, however. The first (already mentioned) is that it excludes people who we 
intuitively want to consider members of the kind. The second is that if someone must satisfy 
the sortal concept female in order to be a member of the kind female and it is possible to stop 
satisfying the sortal concept (e.g. by having a sex change), then, assuming that a person 
persists through such a change (i.e. the person who existed before the sex change does not go 
out of existence), the sortal concept female is not a basic sortal concept, and so the necessary 
condition for being female (i.e. XX chromosomes) is not an essential property of anyone who 
is female. But this seems wrong because intuitively, if anything is an essential property of a 
person, it is her chromosomes (more on this below). 
One way to respond to this problem is to claim that the sortal concept female is not 
the same as the sortal concept woman, or else simply to deny that there is a sortal concept 
female. For example, the concept woman might include features that female does not (e.g. 
dressing or behaving in certain ways). But distinguishing the sortal concepts woman and 
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female does not actually solve the problem; female remains a non-basic sortal concept, so 
chromosomes remain a non-essential property. 
Alternatively, someone might deny that there is a sortal concept female. We only 
think there is such a sortal concept because we assume (incorrectly) that all women are XX; 
we import the sortal concept woman to the necessary (and sufficient) condition for the kind 
female, XX. There is only the sortal concept, woman; the idea that there is a sortal concept 
female arises from the confusion of taking XX to be essential to what falls under the sortal 
concept woman. 
But denying the sortal concept, while it explains how chromosomes are an essential 
property, gives rise to two other problems. One is that it seems that we do have a sortal 
concept female. A second is that if there is no sortal concept female that functions to restrict 
membership in the kind female, and the kind female is characterised by necessary and 
sufficient conditions (i.e. being XX), then we are stuck with two notions of kind – one that 
permits candidate member restriction via sortal concept (Hale’s) and one that relies on 
underlying structure alone (Kripke’s). 
But unlike the earlier account that required two notions of a kind, it might turn out 
this time to be acceptable, even advantageous, especially if this approach accommodates 
what only one kind of kind cannot. If female is a more “scientific” kind than woman, then we 
might expect that it does not rely on a sortal concept, that it can be identified solely in terms 
of underlying structure. But if this were the case, then water (which is at least as scientific a 
kind as female) should also be identifiable by necessary and sufficient conditions; as both 
Hale and Putnam note, H2O is not necessary and sufficient for being water. That is, an 
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advocate of the dual-kind approach would have to explain why female can be identified by 
necessary and sufficient conditions, but water cannot be. 
If we have a sortal concept female, however, then there is a problem with treating 
female as a kind restricted by this sortal concept. Since it is possible to stop satisfying the 
sortal concept without ceasing to exist, female is not a basic sortal concept, and so the 
necessary condition for membership in the kind, XX chromosomes, is not an essential 
property of the members. This goes against the intuition that chromosomes are essential to 
people (i.e. they cannot undergo a change in chromosomes without undergoing a change in 
identity). One way to accommodate the intuition that chromosomes are essential even if 
female is not a basic sortal, is to allow that chromosomes are essential, but only because 
having certain chromosomes is a necessary condition for being a member of a different kind 
that is picked out by a basic sortal. So chromosomes are essential to people because they 
satisfy this other sortal, and not by virtue of satisfying the sortal female, nor by being a 
member of this kind. So chromosomes may not be essential to a female qua female, but may 
be essential to her by being the necessary condition for membership in some other kind. 
But while it may be possible to accommodate intuitions about chromosomes being 
essential, even if female is a phase sortal, the earlier problem, that someone stops being a 
female if she stops satisfying the sortal concept, is left unaccounted for. That is, someone 
who changes her superficial characteristics so that she no longer satisfies the sortal concept 
female is no longer a female (i.e. a member of the kind), despite retaining XX chromosomes. 
Because she still has XX chromosomes, she still seems to be a member of the kind. There are 
two ways to deal with this. The first is just to say that people who do not, or no longer, 
satisfy the sortal concept are not members of the kind (i.e. sortal-satisfaction is necessary for 
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kind membership). The intuition to call people ‘female’ who do not satisfy the sortal is 
attributable to a deficiency in vocabulary; the term(s) (if there is one) for someone whose 
chromosomes do not match her superficial characteristics is (are) not commonly used. So 
when we discover that someone’s superficial characteristics do not match the underlying 
structure in the way we first thought, we continue to group them according to their 
underlying structure, albeit incorrectly. And it is because we continue to classify people 
according to their underlying structure that we consider them members of the kind female, 
even though strictly speaking, they are not. 
But our tendency to classify people according to underlying structure, whether or not 
they satisfy the sortal concept, might suggest that people who satisfy the necessary condition 
are members of the kind, regardless of whether they satisfy the sortal concept that most of 
the other members do. On this account, the sortal concept serves to restrict what initially 
might be considered a member of the kind, based on surface characteristics. Once the 
candidate members of the kind are identified, the necessary condition for being a member is 
what most of these have in common (e.g. most females look a certain way and are also XX; 
so XX is the necessary condition for membership in the kind). And once the necessary 
condition is determined, kind membership may be extended to anything that possesses the 
necessary condition. This would allow us to accommodate the intuition that certain intersex 
individuals and transsexuals are female, even though they do not satisfy the sortal concept. 
It might be objected, however, that using a sortal concept to determine the necessary 
condition for kind membership and then allowing the necessary condition to become both 
necessary and sufficient for kind membership would allow, e.g. a pink solid composed of 
H2O to count as water. After all, if most water is H2O, and we “find” a world where all H2O 
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composes pink solids, then these pink solids are also water. But this need not be so: it seems 
that some of the constraints the sortal places on kind membership can be retained. As 
discussed above, even basic sortal concepts, such as water, are not conceptually basic. So we 
could require that something can be a member of a kind if it 1) satisfies the necessary 
condition and 2) satisfies some minimal number of constituent simple concepts that compose 
the basic sortal. This kind of restriction would allow water that has been dyed red to count as 
water, and for ice (not a liquid) to count as water as well. 
Such an account would allow people who are XX but do not satisfy the sortal concept 
female to be members of the kind female. The necessary condition is determined by a 
property that most of the people who satisfy the sortal concept possess – being XX. But it 
need not include everything that is XX. E.g. were a sea slug discovered to have XX 
chromosomes, it would not be counted as a member of female because it would not satisfy a 
minimal number of the constituent simple concepts of the sortal female. This account also 
allows female to be a basic sortal concept (it is not possible to stop being female without 
changing chromosomes, which intuitively, seems to amount to either a change in identity or a 
going out of existence), and so explains the intuition that chromosomes are essential to a 
person. 
But if the necessary condition for membership in a kind is determined by a property 
that most of the things that fall under the sortal concept possess, it might be argued that the 
kind woman can be characterised by XX for all the reasons female can. That is, most people 
who fall under the sortal concept woman are also XX, and since most people who satisfy the 
sortal concept woman also have this property, it provides the necessary condition for being a 
member of the kind woman; so woman is not actually a distinct kind from female. But there 
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is an important difference between woman and female that allows the latter to be 
characterised by XX and the former not. I have been taking the sortal concepts woman and 
female to have the same content, where this is understood as being composed of the same 
features, or as the terms ‘woman’ and ‘female’ having the same primary intension. Despite 
this, being a member the kinds female and woman does not depend on satisfaction of the 
same necessary condition (i.e. ‘woman’ and ‘female’ do not have the same secondary 
intension). The secondary intension for ‘female’ includes the underlying structure XX, 
whereas the secondary intension for ‘woman’, as discussed above, need not. This accounts 
for why, in order to be a member of the kind woman someone must have certain superficial 
characteristics and not necessarily a particular underlying structure, whereas to be a member 
of the kind female, the underlying structure is more important than the superficial 
characteristics. 
That is, everyone who is a member of the kind female is XX. So XX is the necessary 
condition for membership in the kind female, but not for the kind woman, because most 
people who satisfy the sortal concept female are XX. Additionally, everyone who is XX and 
minimally satisfies the sortal concept female is a member of the kind. 
By contrast, although most members of woman are XX, being XX is not the 
necessary condition for membership in this kind. The reason for this is that not all women (or 
people we want to consider members of the kind woman) have this property. The kind 
woman cannot be identified with the kind female or by the property being XX because 
intuitively, some of the people who are members of the kind woman are neither female nor 
XX. Allowing this to be the necessary condition for membership in woman would allow 
someone to be a member of the kind even if she did not satisfy the sortal concept, just as long 
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as she is XX. But while extending the necessary condition to a sufficient condition 
accommodates intuitions about females, this characterisation of women does not capture 
intuitions about members of the kind woman. In particular, it excludes anyone who satisfies 
the sortal concept but is not XX (i.e. women who are not female), and includes anyone who 
is XX, regardless of what their surface traits are (i.e. people who are XX but fall under the 
sortal concept man). To avoid this, the necessary condition for membership in woman should 
be provided by something that more accurately captures the secondary intension of ‘woman’, 
which, whatever it may be, does not seem to be an underlying physical or biological 
property. 
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4. An Attempt at Social Essence 
Underlying physical properties, or biological properties, do not seem to be what 
provides the necessary condition for membership in the kind woman. One reason for this is 
that if the necessary condition for membership in woman were biological, then it seems that it 
would be either just the same property that provides the necessary condition for female (or at 
least, it would be reducible or traceable to it). So proposing a necessary condition in terms of 
biological properties seems not even to take seriously the idea that woman and female are 
distinct kinds. Another is that, as already discussed, a biological essence to the kind woman 
seems to exclude people we want to include in the kind; so a biological essence would not 
correctly characterise the group. In order to preserve the intuition that people need not have a 
certain biological structure in order to be a woman, the necessary condition for membership 
in the kind needs to be separated from underlying structure. 
Finally, a reason not to take the essence of woman as biological is that feminist 
theorists, such as Marilyn Frye (1983) and Sally Haslanger (2005) argue that a property by 
which women can be identified is not a biological property, but a social property. In 
particular, they identify being oppressed as characteristic of women. While I do not think that 
this need be the property that provides the necessary condition for membership in the kind 
woman, I take it as an example, in order to illustrate how essence might be given by a social 
property. Any of a variety of social properties might provide the necessary condition for kind 
membership, just as long as the property that provides the necessary condition relates to the 
sortal concept and superficial characteristics in the same way as being oppressed does (what 
way this is emerges later). 
In her essay “Oppression” (1983), Marilyn Frye offers a broad definition of 
oppression. She describes what it is to be oppressed, and then argues that women’s 
experiences fit this description. 
The experience of oppressed people is that the living of one’s life is confined and 
shaped by forces and barriers which are not accidental or occasional and hence 
avoidable, but are systematically related to each other in such a way as to catch one 
between and among them and restrict or penalize motion in any direction. (Frye 4). 
 
The reason that women’s lives fit this description is that they are members of a group, 
the group (or kind) woman. “If an individual is oppressed, it is in virtue of being a member of 
a group or category of people that is systematically reduced, molded, immobilized. Thus, to 
recognize a person as oppressed, one has to see that individual as belonging to a group of a 
certain sort,” (Frye 8). Frye is not arguing for a particular conception of the kind woman, or 
that to be a member of the kind just is to be oppressed but that women are, as a matter of fact, 
oppressed, and oppressed because they are women. Her observations (are intended to) apply 
to all members of the group, i.e. be true of all women, so the property she uses to characterise 
women is a plausible candidate for a necessary condition for membership in the kind woman. 
According to Frye, if someone is a woman, then she is oppressed because she is a woman. In 
order for a person to be considered a woman, she must satisfy the sortal concept woman; and 
if she satisfies the sortal concept (i.e. if she has (or is perceived to have) certain superficial 
features) then she is oppressed because she has (or is perceived to have) these features. 
While Frye does not argue that being oppressed is part of what it means to be a 
woman, but simply points out that being oppressed is part of women’s experience, Sally 
Haslanger argues that being oppressed is part of what it means to be a woman, i.e. being 
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oppressed is the necessary condition that someone falling under the sortal concept woman 
must satisfy in order to be a woman. In her article, “Gender and Race” (2005), Haslanger 
identifies being oppressed by virtue of being a woman as the necessary condition someone 
must satisfy in order to be a woman. She says, “On my analysis women are those who 
occupy a particular kind of social position, viz., one of sexually-marked subordinate. So 
women have in common that their (assumed) sex has socially disadvantaged them,” 
(Haslanger 163). One reason for taking this as the property that provides the necessary 
condition for membership in the kind woman is that it seems like the kind of property that 
would apply to everything that falls under the sortal concept. That is, the necessary condition 
is supposed to be determined by what the things that satisfy the sortal concept have in 
common. Since, in the case of women, the things that satisfy the sortal concept are people 
who look a certain way, if they have whatever additional property constitutes the necessary 
condition because they look this way, then anyone who satisfies the necessary condition also 
falls under the sortal concept. So being e.g. oppressed by virtue of (perceived) secondary sex 
characteristics or (assumed) sex is 1) a property that people who satisfy the sortal concept 
woman in fact have and 2) not just part of the concept woman. Both these features make it a 
plausible candidate for (an example of) the necessary condition that must be satisfied in order 
to be a member of the kind woman. 
Using this as the necessary condition for membership in the kind woman allows for 
the separation of woman and female. By appealing to “assumed sex”, Haslanger’s criterion 
 36
includes all the people who look like women, whether or not they actually are XX.2 This 
account of woman does not encounter the same problems as the account of the kind female 
given above. The problem for the account of female was that some people satisfied the 
necessary condition without satisfying the sortal concept, and so would not be considered 
members, if both are required for kind membership. In order to accommodate this, the sortal 
concept was used to determine the necessary condition, and then whatever satisfied the 
necessary condition was admitted to the kind, provided that it also minimally satisfied the 
sortal concept. But on this account of woman, anyone who satisfies the necessary condition 
also automagically satisfies the sortal concept, since it is not possible to be oppressed by 
virtue of being a woman unless you actually are one. 
Besides not falling into the same kinds of difficulty that the kind female did, this 
characterisation of kind woman is interestingly different from female in a variety of ways. 
One is that (as previously mentioned) unlike female (or any other kind I have considered so 
far) the necessary condition for membership in the kind is directly dependent on the sortal 
concept. While the necessary conditions for other kinds depend on the sortal concept in that 
the necessary condition is often taken to be whatever is common to the things that satisfy the 
sortal concept (i.e. were the content of the sortal concept different, it would apply to different 
things, so the necessary condition for kind membership would also be different), the 
necessary condition for woman actually contains the content of the sortal concept woman – 
(perceived) secondary sex characteristics.  Because of this, the satisfaction of the necessary 
condition for membership in the kind woman depends on satisfaction of the sortal concept in 
                                                 
2 The assumption that sex is determined by chromosomes (and so that “assumed sex” refers to “assumed 
chromosomal structure), rather than surface traits alone, is not one that Haslanger makes explicit, but this is how 
I am choosing to interpret it, especially since it is in line with my earlier discussion of female. 
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a way satisfaction of the necessary condition for female does not depend on the sortal 
concept female. In order to satisfy the sortal concept woman, someone must possess certain 
surface traits, and it is because she possesses these traits that she satisfies the necessary 
condition for membership in the kind woman. And if someone satisfies the necessary 
condition, she satisfies it only by virtue of possessing certain surface traits, and so falls under 
the sortal concept. So the necessary condition for membership in the kind woman is also a 
sufficient condition for membership in the kind. Anyone who is a member of the kind woman 
is oppressed by virtue of being a woman (i.e. satisfying the sortal concept woman), and 
anyone who satisfies the necessary condition also satisfies the sortal concept and so is a 
member of the kind. So the kind woman turns out to be vaguely Kripkean (in that it is 
characterised by necessary and sufficient conditions) after all. 
The kind woman, although it can be characterised by necessary and sufficient 
conditions, differs from other Kripkean kinds (e.g. water) in at least two important ways. The 
first is that the necessary and sufficient conditions for Kripkean kinds are given in terms of 
underlying physical structure. But for the kind woman, the necessary and sufficient 
conditions are given in terms of surface characteristics, which are not directly dependent on a 
single underlying physical structure, and what results from possession of these. 
Another way in which woman differs from a kind that is typically characterised in 
terms of necessary and sufficient conditions is that the kind of necessity with which the 
essence attaches to its members (or with which the members satisfy the conditions) is not 
metaphysical necessity or even physical necessity. Because being oppressed is a social 
property, the members of the kind woman only possess this property in particular social 
systems. So although the kind is characterised by necessary and sufficient conditions which 
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can serve to pick out members of the kind, satisfaction of the conditions is neither absolute 
nor relative to physical laws; it is relative to social structures. Because of this, the necessary 
(and sufficient) condition for membership in the kind woman is not satisfied necessarily by 
anyone who happens to actually satisfy it. Even if secondary sex characteristics are essential 
to kind members, it is not necessary that they are oppressed because of them. That is, the 
conditions that must be satisfied in order to be a member of the kind woman are only 
essential to the members insofar as it is necessary that they are part of certain social systems, 
and that those social systems are the way they are. 
Even though woman is a kind that can be characterised by necessary and sufficient 
conditions, the sortal concept woman is not a basic sortal, it is a phase sortal. The reason that 
woman is not a basic sortal is that someone may satisfy the sortal for part of her existence, 
but not for another, without thereby ceasing to exist.3 If a woman has an operation that 
changes her superficial characteristics so that she no longer satisfies the sortal concept 
woman but instead satisfies the sortal concept man, she arguably has not gone out of 
existence, although she no longer satisfies the sortal concept woman. Although she no longer 
satisfies the sortal concept, she may still be a member of the kind if she continues to satisfy 
the necessary condition (as we saw with female, once the necessary condition is determined 
by what falls under the sortal concept, the necessary condition may also be sufficient for kind 
membership). But unlike the sortal concept female, where it is possible to stop falling under 
the sortal concept and continue to satisfy the necessary condition (and so remain a member of 
                                                 
3 It might be thought that woman is obviously a phase sortal, since we don’t consider babies or children to be 
women. Perhaps the idea of basic sortal could be somewhat broadened to avoid this problem. E.g. a basic sortal 
is one that once something does satisfy it, if it stops satisfying it, it stops existing. Anyway, it seems that this 
kind of modification would be needed to account for development in all kinds of species. 
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the kind), it is not possible to stop satisfying the sortal concept woman and continue to satisfy 
the necessary condition. The reason for this is that satisfying the necessary condition depends 
on satisfying the sortal concept. 
But women are not essentially members of the kind woman for another reason, that is, 
not just because woman is not a basic sortal. Although one way for a woman to stop being a 
member of the kind woman is to first stop satisfying the sortal concept and so stop satisfying 
the necessary condition, another way for a woman to stop being a member of the kind woman 
is to first stop satisfying the necessary condition. Not satisfying the necessary condition, 
while still satisfying the sortal concept, does not involve a change in the appearance of an 
individual woman, but a change in the social structure in which she finds herself. Because 
satisfying the necessary condition depends on social structure, a change in this structure 
could affect whether women are oppressed by virtue of their (perceived) secondary sex 
characteristics, and so affect whether they continue to be members of the kind woman. 
Haslanger argues that this is the kind of change that needs to be brought about: “In fact, I 
believe it is part of the project of feminism to bring about a day when there are no more 
women (though, of course, we should not aim to do away with females!)” (Haslanger 163-
164). 
4.1. Objections to this Kind of Account 
In the preceding section, I have argued for a characterisation of the kind woman 
where the necessary condition appeals to satisfaction of the sortal condition. That is, the 
necessary condition for membership in the kind woman is given as ‘having property P by 
virtue of (perceived) secondary sex characteristics or (assumed) sex’. But because 
satisfaction of the necessary condition (regardless of the specifics of what P are) requires 
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satisfaction of the sortal concept, and the content of the sortal is given by conceptual 
analysis, it might be argued that the necessary condition for membership in the kind woman 
is also just determined by conceptual analysis. If so, then it is not surprising that the 
necessary condition is also a sufficient condition – the condition is determined by conceptual 
analysis, and so is necessary and sufficient because that just is what it is to be a member of 
the kind woman. That is, the necessary condition, because it is just a matter of conceptual 
analysis, is not doing any metaphysical work in determining who or what women are. 
But just because determining the content of the sortal concept woman (i.e. 
determining which features someone must have in order to satisfy the concept) is a matter of 
conceptual analysis, determining whether people who satisfy the criterion given by the 
analysis have some additional property (e.g. being oppressed) is not so determined; nor is it 
determined by conceptual analysis whether or how the attribution of this property is related 
to the original criterion. While the identifying marks of women may be determined 
conceptually, that people with these marks also possess some other property (such as being 
oppressed) is not. The necessary condition is not given by conceptual analysis, it is 
discovered. 
Another problem that might arise from the sortal concept woman appearing in the 
necessary condition for membership in the kind woman is that it seems that the content of the 
sortal concept woman is the same as sortal concept female; anyone who satisfies one sortal 
concept satisfies the other. As such, it seems that the necessary condition for membership in 
the kind woman, ‘being oppressed in virtue of (perceived) secondary sex characteristics’, is 
equivalent to both ‘being oppressed in virtue of being a woman’ and ‘being oppressed in 
virtue of being a female’ (if it is supposed that sortal terms ‘woman’ and ‘female’ are 
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equivalent to the content of the sortal terms, ‘(perceived) to have certain secondary sex 
characteristics’). And this, it might be argued, shows that women do, in fact, have a 
biological essence and are, after all, just the same as the kind female. 
But while the substitution of ‘woman’ for the sortal content is legitimate, the 
substitution of ‘female’ is not. If ‘female’ is substituted in for the sortal content in the 
necessary condition for the kind woman, then the condition reads as ‘being oppressed by 
virtue of having (or being perceived to have) certain secondary sex characteristics and 
additionally, being XX’ – that is, the inclusion of ‘female’ limits the people who in fact 
qualify as members of the kind woman to those who have a certain underlying structure and 
are oppressed by virtue of the characteristics this structure gives rise to. But the necessary 
condition for membership in the kind woman is due to superficial characteristics, not 
underlying structure, and the superficial characteristics are not systematically related to any 
specific underlying structure. So interpreting the property as equivalent to ‘oppressed by 
virtue of being female’ excludes anyone who falls under the sortal concept woman but is not, 
in fact, XX, even though people who fall under the sortal concept woman may well be 
oppressed because of their appearance without being XX. ‘Female’ cannot simply be 
substituted in to the necessary condition that characterises the kind woman, even though 
‘female’ has the same primary intension as ‘woman’, because the substituting ‘female’ also 
imports the secondary intension of ‘female’, and so imposes an extra requirement on the 
necessary condition for membership in woman, namely that they all be XX, which needs to 
be avoided. 
Finally, someone might object to the idea that the necessary condition for 
membership in the kind woman does any real metaphysical work because the necessary 
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condition is given by conceptual analysis. This objection differs from the one raised earlier; 
this time, the charge of conceptual analysis is not due to the appearance of the sortal concept 
(admittedly determined by conceptual analysis) in the necessary condition, but to the social 
nature of the necessary condition. That is, someone might think that the kind woman, as 
characterised by a necessary and sufficient condition, reduces the term ‘woman’ to what 
Putnam calls a “ ‘one-criterion’ word” (1975: 244), similar to ‘pediatrician’. While there are 
necessary and sufficient conditions for being a pediatrician, determining which conditions 
must be satisfied is simply a matter of defining the term ‘pediatrician’. 
[W]e might doubt that there are any true one-criterion words in natural language, 
apart from stipulative contexts. Couldn’t it turn out that pediatricians aren’t doctors 
but Martian spies? Answer ‘yes’, and you have abandoned the synonymy of 
‘pediatrician’ and ‘doctor specializing in the care of children’. It seems that there is a 
strong tendency for words which are introduced as ‘one-criterion’ words to develop a 
‘natural kind’ sense, with all the concomitant rigidity and indexicality. (Putnam 244). 
 
That is, it seems that there is an essential property to being a pediatrician, namely, 
being a doctor specialising in the care of children. This does not mean, however, that there is 
a metaphysically interesting kind, pediatrician. The reason for this is that the property that 
gives the criterion for being a member of the kind is stipulated – satisfaction of the conditions 
for membership in the “kind” is simply given by the meaning of the word ‘pediatrician’. 
If the kind woman were similar to the kind pediatrician, then the property that 
provided the criterion for membership in woman would tell us no more about what it is to be 
a woman than is given by the meaning (or primary intension) of the word.4 There are two 
reasons for thinking that woman might be the same kind of “kind” as pediatrician. One is 
                                                 
4 If woman were a kind like pediatrician, then the only criterion for being a member of the kind would be 
satisfying the sortal concept (or primary intension); the secondary intension could not be part of the criterion, 
because the property it picks out is not determined by stipulation or conceptual analysis. 
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that both kinds seem to depend on something essentially social. Another is that both 
pediatrician and woman are phase sortals – so while it may be that the properties are 
essential to the kind, they do not attach essentially to the kind members. 
While the kind woman does share these features with the “kind” pediatrician, it 
seems that it is not simply a kind determined by a ‘one-criterion’ word, because, as argued 
earlier, the property that provides the necessary condition for membership in the kind is not 
determined by conceptual analysis. While being a doctor that specialises in the care of 
children just is (part of) the meaning of ‘pediatrician’, it does not seem that possessing some 
social property (e.g. being oppressed) because of her (perceived) secondary sex 
characteristics or (assumed) sex is part of the meaning of ‘woman’. Although the property 
does not attach to women necessarily, that it attaches to women at all is not determined by 
analysing what the word ‘woman’ means. So the property that characterises the kind woman 
is doing metaphysical work; it is not given simply by conceptual analysis. 
4.2. Summary 
In this section, I argued that the necessary condition for membership in the kind 
woman can be given in terms of a social property. I considered as an example of such a 
property being oppressed by virtue of (perceived) secondary sex characteristics, although it 
seems that other social properties could equally well characterise the kind woman, just as 
long as the members of the kind have the property because they satisfy the sortal concept (i.e. 
they satisfy the necessary condition because they have certain superficial characteristics). 
Understanding the essential property of the kind woman in terms of a social property 
and social structure results in the emergence of a kind of kind that is interestingly different 
than kinds that are characterised in terms of underlying structure. While the criterion for 
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membership in the kinds based on underlying structure, such as female, cannot be given in 
terms of necessary and sufficient conditions (because of Putnam’s worries about physical 
laws), the criterion for membership in the kind woman can be. In this way, woman is very 
much like a Kripkean kind, in that the kind can be identified with a single property – e.g. 
being oppressed by virtue of (perceived) secondary sex characteristics. But unlike Kripkean 
kinds, it is not the case that anyone who has this property has it necessarily. The property that 
the kind can be identified with (i.e. the property essential to the kind) is not an essential 
property of the kind members. Women can stop being women either by changing their 
physical appearance (this does not mean that they stop being female, however), or by no 
longer being in a social system which oppresses because of their physical appearance. 
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5. Conclusion 
I began this paper by claiming that in order to understand statements about the lives 
or conditions of women or answer questions about what might be done to improve their 
situation (if it in fact needs to be improved), we first need to ascertain who we are talking 
about. I hope to have at least provided a starting point for this project. 
Towards the end of determining who and what women are, I have argued that 
although superficial physical characteristics are of central importance to characterising the 
kind, underlying physical characteristics are not. But underlying physical structure is 
essential to being female; so determining answers to questions about what should be done for 
women cannot be answered by determining what should be done for females. Furthermore, 
this distinction makes it possible to ask in a particular situation whether the kind we ought be 
concerned with is woman or female, and to address issues concerning the one or the other 
appropriately. 
I have also shown that there is a legitimate and metaphysically interesting 
understanding of the notion of a kind that does not depend on underlying physical structure, 
but on superficial physical and social structure. While this characterisation departs in certain 
ways from the Kripkean notion of what a kind is (e.g. it is not given in terms of underlying 
physical structure, and the property by virtue of which the members are in the kind need not 
be a property they possess necessarily), it remains faithful to it in ways that kinds 
characterised in terms of underlying structure do not (e.g. the criterion for membership in 
such a kind can be identified with one property, which is both necessary and sufficient for 
membership in the kind). While including kinds that are not based on underlying physical 
structure might seem to broaden the notion of kind in an unintuitive direction, it might also 
be seen as an attempt to preserve certain features of the Kripkean account that cannot be 
retained by kinds based in underlying physical structure. 
Finally, although I do not ultimately argue for any specific property as the one that 
someone must possess in order to be a member of the kind woman, I hope that my discussion 
has provided a basis for determining what kind of property this is – in particular, that it must 
be a non-biological property. And if the kind woman is to be identified with this property (i.e. 
if the property is to be both necessary and sufficient for membership in the kind), then 
members of the kind must have this property by virtue of satisfying the sortal concept woman 
(or by virtue of satisfying the primary intension of the term ‘woman’). Since sortal concepts, 
or primary intensions,  are given by superficial properties, requiring that the sortal concept be 
satisfied in order to be a member of the kind5 explains  how and why superficial 
characteristics are essential to the kind woman. 
                                                 
5 This is not achieved by making sortal satisfaction necessary for kind membership as part of the theory (which 
causes problems when kind membership is determined by underlying structure, as was the case with female) but 
by building sortal satisfaction into the necessary conditions for individual kinds. 
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